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In 1982, the US Congress established the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC)
as the sole appellate court for patent cases. Ostensibly, this court was created to eliminate
inconsistencies in the application and interpretation of patent law across federal courts, and
thereby mitigate the incentives of patentees and alleged infringers to \forum shop" for a
preferred venue. We perform the ¯rst econometric study of the extent of non-uniformity and
forum shopping in the pre-CAFC era and of the CAFC's impact on these phenomena. We
¯nd that in patentee-plainti® cases the pre-CAFC era was indeed characterized by signi¯cant
non-uniformity in patent validity rates across circuits and by forum shopping on the basis
of validity rates. We ¯nd weak evidence that the CAFC has increased uniformity of validity
rates and strong evidence that forum shopping on the basis of validity rates ceased several
years prior to the CAFC's establishment. In patentee-defendant cases, we ¯nd that validity
rates are lower on average, but do not ¯nd either signi¯cant non-uniformity of validity rates
across circuits or signi¯cant forum shopping.
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In perhaps the most signi¯cant institutional change to the federal judiciary since the
Circuit Courts of Appeal were established in 1891, the US Congress in 1982 created the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) and endowed it with exclusive jurisdiction
over appeals in patent cases initiated in US district courts. Ostensibly, the CAFC was
created to unify the interpretation and application of US patent law across circuits, thereby
eliminating the incentives for patentees and alleged infringers to \forum shop" for a favorable
court (Ja®e and Lerner 2004). The CAFC is the only appellate court de¯ned by subject
matter alone. Hence, it presents a unique opportunity to study the economic impact of a
centralized judiciary.
In this paper, we exploit variation in district court patent validity decisions, sorted by
circuit, and ¯nd that non-uniformity and forum shopping were prevalent in the pre-CAFC
era. We also ¯nd that the CAFC mitigates but does not eliminate non-uniformity across
circuits. Forum shopping on the basis of validity rates ceases in the late 1970s, several
years prior to the CAFC. However, these results hold only for cases in which the patentee
chooses where to litigate and ¯les the case, i.e., where the patentee is the plainti® (henceforth
patentee-plainti® cases).1 We ¯nd no evidence of forum shopping by alleged infringers or
patent challengers. Our study is an important step toward assessing the welfare impact of
the CAFC.
We study these questions using data on validity decisions during 1953-2002. Our data
include variables recorded from opinions in patent litigation decisions published in the United
States Patents Quarterly (USPQ) and variables captured from associated patent documents.
Throughout the paper, we specify the geographical circuit as the forum and analyze district
court decisions aggregated by circuit. In essence, we treat each set of district courts within
a circuit as a single district court. In the pre-CAFC era, the decisions made in a given set
of districts are subject to appellate review from the relevant geographical circuit court of
appeal. In the CAFC, the decisions made in all sets of districts are subject to appellate
review by the CAFC.
1It is important to distinguish cases by whether the patentee chooses the venue of litigation. For the sake
of brevity, we use the patentee's identity with respect to initiation of litigation (plainti® or defendant) to
make this distinction.
2We apply two discrete-choice models to test for uniformity and forum shopping. First,
we use a binary-choice model of patent validity to estimate di®erences in circuit ¯xed e®ects
and test for non-uniformity in district court validity decisions across circuits. All else equal,
we estimate the di®erence between districts in the weakest circuit (Third) and the strongest
(Tenth) in the probability of patent validity to be about .52 in the pre-CAFC era, but only
.25 in the CAFC era. This result, along with our ¯nding of signi¯cant circuit ¯xed e®ects
generally, suggests that patentees could gain a tactical advantage by choosing a particular
circuit in each era, but that this potential advantage was far greater in the decentralized
pre-CAFC era.
Second, we use a binary-choice model of trial circuit location to test for forum shopping.
If litigants shop, then we expect patentee-plainti®s to tend to choose districts favorable on
validity.2 Up to 1977, we ¯nd that the most recent ¯ve years' validity rate in districts
in a patentee's \home" circuit,3 net of the national average validity rate, has signi¯cant
predictive value in whether the patentee chooses to litigate in that circuit. Speci¯cally, an
increase in this home validity advantage of .10 results in an increase of between .05 and .09 in
the probability the case is litigated in the home circuit. This e®ect vanishes after 1977 and
does not re-emerge. Hence, our evidence suggests systematic forum shopping on the basis
of validity in the pre-CAFC era and that the CAFC, by increasing uniformity, mitigated
such forum shopping. We also conclude that patentees anticipated the impact of the CAFC
several years prior to its establishment in 1982.
By contrast, in the roughly ten percent of cases where the patent challenger initiates
litigation by choosing the venue and ¯ling the case, i.e. where the patentee is the defendant
(henceforth patentee-defendant cases), validity is about .10 less likely on average, but we
do not ¯nd strong evidence of non-uniformity of validity outcomes across circuits in either
era. Indeed, even in the pre-CAFC era, circuit validity rates in patentee-plainti® cases are
uncorrelated with rates in patentee-defendant cases. This suggests that even if a defendant
could gain a tactical advantage by being the forum-naming plainti®,4 it would not predictably
2As we discuss in our theoretical model in Section 3, patent challengers would seek districts unfavorable
on validity.
3This is de¯ned according to the patent assignee's physical location. See section 4
4Our analysis cannot identify whether the lower validity rate is a treatment or selection e®ect. Marco
(2004) also ¯nds validity rates to be higher in patentee-plainti® cases, and suggests that the e®ect represents
the selection of weaker patents into \defensive" positions.
3gain further by choosing a particular forum. It is then not surprising that we also ¯nd no
evidence of forum shopping on the basis of validity rates in patentee-defendant cases in either
era. Given the lower number of patentee-defendant cases, however, our conclusions about
them are more tenuous.
Finally, changes in the venue statute due to the 1988 Judicial Improvements and Access
to Justice Act did not signi¯cantly a®ect case location. Moore (2001) and others have argued
that these changes made the standards for jurisdiction more °exible.5 In particular, prior
to the changes in the statute (and the subsequent CAFC ruling in VE Holding Corp. v.
Johnson Gas Appliance Co. (1990)), venue for declaratory judgment actions was handled
under the general provision of the statute (\personal jurisdiction," section 1391(c)), whereas
patent infringement actions were held to a more restrictive standard (section 1400(b)). After
VE Holding, both declaratory judgment actions and patent infringement actions were held to
the \personal jurisdiction" standard.6 In any event, we ¯nd no evidence that these changes
had a signi¯cant impact on trial circuit choice or on the nature of forum shopping.
Since our data are insu±cient to estimate precise district-level validity rates, aggregating
across districts by circuit o®ers the best available identi¯cation strategy. This strategy is
particularly appropriate for studying the impact of the CAFC. Since the CAFC was created
to eliminate disagreements among circuits, it is clearly appropriate to study uniformity and
forum shopping in the pre-CAFC era by comparing circuit ¯xed e®ects on validity rates and
by analyzing the determinants of circuit choice, respectively. Because the establishment of
the CAFC eliminated appellate review by the geographical circuits, the only variability in
patent decisions across venues for 1983-2002 occurs at the district level. Across the pre-CAFC
and CAFC eras, the set of district courts is almost constant, but the source of precedents
and judicial review is di®erent. Thus, in comparing the variation in district court validity
decisions across geographical circuits and across the two eras, we identify the CAFC's impact
on uniformity at the district level. We similarly analyze forum shopping using variation in
516 USPQ2d 1614 [CAFC 1990].
6The application of personal jurisdiction to patent infringement cases means that, for the purposes of
venue, alleged infringers are subject to the \minimum contacts" standard (Harmon, 2003, p. 536). Personal
jurisdiction is universally accepted by scholars to be less restrictive than the \regular and established place
of business" standard of section 1400(b) (Moore, 2001; Wille, 1991; Keller and Nunnenkamp, 1991; Harmon,
2003). Thus, subsequent to VE Holding, patent holders have greater latitude in district choice; the playing
¯eld is even between alleged infringers and patent holders (Wille, 1991).
4circuit location choices.
To place our inquiry in the appropriate institutional context, we discuss the background
of the CAFC's establishment and review of related literature in section 2. To motivate our
empirical tests, we introduce and analyze a simple, stylized model of forum choice in section
3. We describe the data and present descriptive evidence in section 4, then present the main
results in section 5. Section 6 discusses our results and concludes.
2. Background
The original basis for appeals court reform was an overload of cases, relative to judges.
In 1972, Congress established the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate
System, Structure and Internal Procedures, better known as the Hruska Commission,7 to
investigate possibilities for reform. Patent advocates, unhappy over a perceived disparity
across circuits in the interpretation and application of patent law, capitalized on this oppor-
tunity to seek a uni¯ed appellate court (Scherer 2006). Their arguments are re°ected in the
statements of Professor James Gambrell and patent attorney Donald Dunner, recorded in
the ¯nal report of the Hruska Commission (1975).8 Based largely on 240 responses by patent
attorneys to a survey, Gambrell and Dunner conclude that there is signi¯cant non-uniformity
in the interpretation and application of patent law. Some 48% of the responders indicate
that \di®erences in the application of the law" among circuits were a \major problem,"
while 28% indicate that \di®erences in interpretation of law" were a problem.9 In a letter
to the Hruska Commission, Gambrell and Dunner argue that the study con¯rms their own
experience that \...the lack of uniformity in decisions on patent-related issues has been a
widespread and continuing fact of life."10
Gambrell and Dunner also argue that \forum disputes and the extensive forum shopping
that goes on" are \directly attributable" to di®erences in the interpretation and application
of the law, particularly that on patent validity. In their letter, they write \...patent owners
and alleged infringers spend inordinate amounts of time, e®ort and money jockeying for a
7Popularly named for Senator Roman Hruska (who chaired the committee), it was created by Public Law
489 (92nd Cong., 2d sess., 13 October 1972).
867 F.R.D. 195 [1975]
967 F.R.D. at 369-70. To our knowledge, the full results of this survey are not published.
1067 F.R.D. at 370.
5post position in the right court for the right issues. Nowhere is this quest more vigorously
pursued than for the right forum to rule on validity." Based, presumably, on their collec-
tive experience, they also name the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits as being particularly
favorable to patentees.11
Several scholars have commented on the uniformity and forum shopping issues as they
were perceived in the 1970s and earlier. Like Gambrell and Dunner, Harmon (1992, p.
574) says the Seventh Circuit was favorable for patentees, but does not discuss the Fifth
or Sixth Circuits: \When this author broke into the business, and for many years after, it
was quite clear that there was no such thing as a valid patent in the Eighth Circuit, and
the climate in the Ninth Circuit was not much more hospitable. In the Seventh Circuit, on
the other hand, patent infringement could get a client into big trouble. Each of the other
circuits occupied its own band in the enforcement spectrum,..." In contrast to Gambrell
and Dunner, Dreyfuss (1989, p. 7) implies that the Fifth and Seventh Circuits were quite
di®erent: \forum shopping was rampant, and...a request to transfer a patent infringement
action from Texas, in the Fifth Circuit, to Illinois, in the Seventh Circuit, would be bitterly
fought in both circuits and, ultimately, in the Supreme Court."
To address these perceived problems, the Hruska Commission recommended that a na-
tional appeals court be established to handle particularly di±cult questions of patent law,
which would be transferred from the geographical Circuit Courts of Appeal.12 Notably, the
report soundly rejected the proposal for a separate appeals court like the CAFC.13 How-
ever, after several more years of lobbying, hearings and debate, Congress passed the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982,14 which created the CAFC and established it as the sole
US appeals court in patent cases.
The uni¯cation of the interpretation and application of patent law brought clear conse-
quences. For example, early CAFC interpretations strengthened the statutory presumption
of patent validity (35 U.S.C. 282), making an invalidity defense less viable.15 Numerous
1167 F.R.D. at 370.
1267 F.R.D. at 371.
13See Scherer (2006) for a detailed discussion.
14(Public Law 164. 97th Cong., 2d sess., 2 April 1982).
15According to Quillen (1993, pp. 192-95), the CAFC's three most important changes were the elevation
of nonstatutory factors in the determination of nonobviousness, the narrowing of the scope of prior art as it
pertains to the obviousness issue, and the enforcement of the \clear and convincing evidence" standard for
proving invalidity.
6patent attorneys and legal scholars (Kastriner 1991; Harmon 1992; Quillen 1993; Goldstein
1993) note the CAFC's strengthening of the presumption.16 Empirically, Henry and Turner
(2006) and Marco (2004) ¯nd that the CAFC accounts for a signi¯cant increase in the prob-
ability of validity.17 Not surprisingly, the CAFC has earned a reputation as a \pro-patent"
court, and this subject has received considerable attention in the economics and legal litera-
tures. Bessen and Meurer (2005, 2008), for example, study the surge in patent litigation in
the 1990s and conclude that \legal changes," including the establishment of the CAFC, are
largely responsible. Another group of papers (Kortum and Lerner 1998; Hall and Ziedonis
2001; Hall 2005) studies the \Friendly Court Hypothesis," which contends that the estab-
lishment of the CAFC is responsible for the simultaneous surge in patenting in the early
1980s. This research has yet to settle whether this hypothesis is correct.18
While there are many anecdotes showing circuit forum shopping in patent cases prior to
1982,19 ours is the ¯rst research to characterize its nature and extent in both the pre-CAFC
and CAFC eras.20 This is surprising, since uniformity and forum shopping were the major
problems that the CAFC was ostensibly created to address. Indeed, we know of only one
paper that studies forum shopping in patent litigation.
Moore (2001) studies litigation over 1983-99 and argues that forum shopping over validity
rates still exists under the CAFC. She does not directly model choice of forum along with
litigation outcome, nor can her data assess the impact of the CAFC. Like Moore, Clermont
and Eisenberg (1995) compare outcomes in cases where the plainti® named the forum to
16Kastriner (1991, p. 10) refers to the enforcement of the presumption of validity as \the ¯rst step taken
by the CAFC which materially strengthened patents." Harmon (1992, p. 575) writes that \the Federal
Circuit's rigorous observation of the presumption of validity" has made obviousness a more di±cult defense
in patent litigation. Goldstein (1993, p. 365) states, \The CAFC has not only eliminated intramural con°ict
and forum shopping. The court has also buttressed the patent grant itself, giving new force to the statutory
presumption of validity." Merges (1997) also discusses the \pro-patent" reputation of the CAFC.
17Henry and Turner use structural break analysis to estimate that increases in rates of validity occurred
at the onset of the CAFC's tenure. They estimate an increase in the probability of validity in district court
decisions of .26 occurred in 1982, and an increase in the probability an \invalid" decision is not a±rmed of
.29 in 1983. Marco (2004) estimates that the CAFC increased the validity rate by .20.
18Kortum and Lerner (1998) argue that a simultaneous surge in the productivity of R&D explains the
surge in patenting, while Hall and Ziedonis (2001) and Hall (2005) conclude that the CAFC is responsible
for some of the surge.
19For example, the case of Bros Incorporated v. W.E. Grace Manufacturing Company et al. (140 USPQ
324 [N.D.TX 1964]) lasted more than ten years and included simultaneous actions in districts in the Fifth,
Sixth and Eighth Circuits.
20There are some published works that include statistics on rates of patent invalidity by circuit (Koenig
1980; Federico 1956).
7those where the defendant transferred the case, and ¯nd that the transfer option counters
the negative aspects of forum shopping. They do not analyze patent litigation, however. In
analyzing antitrust litigation, Perlo®, Rubinfeld and Ruud (1996) ¯nd systematic di®erences
across fora, and argue that this may encourage shopping. In a theoretical treatment, Lerner
and Tirole (2006) study forum shopping for certi¯cation of quality, not in the context of
litigation.
3. Theory
In litigation, the patentee is endowed with the choice of forum. An alleged infringer may
bring suit via a declaratory judgment action only if an actual controversy exists between
the patentee and the alleged infringer. If the patentee makes an explicit threat to sue (e.g.
sends a cease-and-desist letter), then the alleged infringer can easily get jurisdiction for a
declaratory judgment action. Without such a threat, however, the alleged infringer must
show that the patentee's past actions (in previous litigation, license negotiations, etc.) give
a reasonable apprehension of suit. Thus, the forum-choice stage of patent litigation is a
sequential-move game, in which the patentee moves ¯rst.
To provide a framework for understanding the main empirical inquiries in this paper, we
develop and analyze a stylized decision-theoretic model with three circuit courts, 1;2 and
3: Let the set of circuits be de¯ned as C = f1;2;3g: In each case, there is a set of available
fora, CA µ C, and a natural forum, cN 2 CA: We assume that there is positive probability
associated with each combination of cN and CA:
The patentee has the sole opportunity to name the forum for the trial, cT: This is without
loss of generality|if the alleged infringer had the choice of forum, the results below would
change in cosmetic ways only. For simplicity, we assume that infringement is certain. The
circuits are heterogeneous with respect to the likelihood that the patentee's patent is valid.
Speci¯cally, the probability of validity in the three circuits is, respectively, ®1;®2 and ®3;
with ®1 > ®2 > ®3. Further, de¯ne ¯1 ´ ®1 ¡ ®3 and ¯2 ´ ®2 ¡ ®3 as the di®erences in
validity rates relative to circuit 3, and assume that ¯2 = 1
2¯1 ´ ¯: We refer to ¯ as the step in
validity between circuits. We assume a constant step between circuits to model uniformity
with a single parameter, thereby avoiding a taxonomy.
8If the patent is held valid, damages of V are awarded from the infringer to the patentee.
Litigation in any forum costs L: Forum shopping, the naming of any forum other than the
natural forum, carries an additional cost ¢L: For simplicity, we assume that no settlement
takes place,21 and that litigation is always a credible strategy for both parties.
Clearly, the forum-shopping decision is trivial whenever CA is a singleton. The interesting
cases are thus where CA 2 ff1;2g;f1;3g;f2;3g;f1;2;3gg: We restrict remaining attention
to these cases. Let the circuit ci 2 CA where ®i is the largest be c; and that with the smallest
®i be c:
Clearly, if the natural forum is most favorable to the party naming the trial forum, the
choice is trivial.
Remark 1 If c is natural, then the patentee names c:
Thus, the patentee names 1 whenever 1 is the natural forum, and names 2 if CA = f2;3g
and 2 is the natural forum. The reason is that naming c when it is natural results in the
highest likelihood of validity and carries no additional litigation costs.
If c is not the natural forum, then the patentee must weigh the higher likelihood of valid-
ity in c versus the additional litigation costs ¢L: Next, consider the cases where the natural
forum is not most favorable.
Remark 2 Suppose c is not natural.
21The model's predictions do not change if the following hold: (i) settlement bargaining is over foregone
litigation costs, (ii) the parties split these costs according to a constant fraction, and (iii) rates of settlement
are constant across circuits. We do not observe settlement rates in our main data source, which relies on
published litigation decisions, and we know of no existing data source for settlement rates, by circuit, for the
period when we identify signi¯cant forum shopping (1963-77). For cases terminated during 1979-2000, we can
estimate settlement across circuits using the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research
Data [ FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE, 1970-2000, Computer ¯le. Conducted
by the Federal Judicial Center. ICPSR08429-v7. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political
and Social Research (producer and distributor), 2005-04-29]. Rates of settlement vary between .83 and .88
among the circuits for this period . By contrast, conditional on non-settlement, validity rates across circuits
for 1953-82 vary between .25 and .81, and validity rates for 1983-2002 vary between .64 and .83 (see Table
1, discussed in detail in Section 4.1). The fact that the range of variation in validity rates is greater, and
the fact that we ¯nd these rates to be uncorrelated with the estimated rates of settlement for 1979-2000
terminations, gives us con¯dence that di®erences in settlement rates do not upset the predictions of the
model. Further, it is unnecessary to include settlement rates in our empirical analysis of forum shopping.
9(i) If ¯ ¸ ¢L
V ; then the patentee names c for any CA:
(ii) If ¢L
2V · ¯ < ¢L
V ; then the patentee names c if CA = f1;3g or if CA = f1;2;3g and 3 is
the natural forum. Otherwise the patentee names cN:
(iii) If ¯ < ¢L
2V ; then the patentee names cN.
Hence, whenever the patentee shops, she chooses c: She is more inclined to shop when the
validity step is larger, when the value of the damages is larger, and when the cost of shopping
is smaller.
While our data permit us to estimate the di®erences in validity rates, f¯ig, they do
not o®er us this luxury with respect to V or ¢L, because the ratio ¢L
V is what matters in
determining whether shopping is optimal. We de¯ne, without loss of generality, Z = ¢L
V , and
assume that Z is distributed on the positive real line according to the cumulative distribution
function F, where F is increasing and continuously di®erentiable.
Given Remark 2, it is clear that, ex ante, the probability that a given patentee shops,
conditional on only a one-validity-step increase being available, is F(¯), while the probability
that a given patentee shops, conditional on a two-validity-step increase being available, is
F(2¯). This ¯nding gives rise to our ¯rst proposition.
Proposition 1. The unconditional probability a given patent case forum shops is increasing
in ¯.
Proof. This follows directly from the fact that the conditional probability of forum shopping
of any patent case, in any circuit, is non-decreasing in ¯, while it is strictly increasing in ¯
if there is a possible increase in the validity step through shopping. QED
Thus, when the circuits are less uniform (¯ is higher), forum shopping is more likely. We
can also draw conclusions about the relative likelihood of forum shopping, conditional on
the natural forum.
Proposition 2. If, conditional on ci, each CA is equally likely, then the probability of forum
shopping for a patent case whose natural circuit is i is decreasing in ®i.
10Proof. Conditioning on the natural forum, each CA that includes cN occurs with probability
1=4. Consider ¯rst cN = 3. With probability 1=2, there is a possible one-validity-step increase
from shopping, while with probability 1=4; there is a possible two-validity-step increase.
Thus, we have
Prob(Shopji = 3) = (1=2)F(¯) + (1=4)F(2¯):
When cN = 2, the probability of a one-validity-step increase remains 1=2, but there is no
possibility of a two-step increase:
Prob(Shopji = 2) = (1=2)F(¯):
Clearly, the probability of shopping when cN = 1 is zero. Thus, Prob(Shopji = 3) >
Prob(Shopji = 2) > Prob(Shopji = 1). QED
Intuitively, weaker circuits are the source of shopped patents with greater frequency, while
stronger circuits are targets.
Using data on validity decisions, we test for uniformity across courts, and test for the
impact of the establishment of the CAFC. Estimating the di®erences in validity rates f¯ig
is key. Using data on circuit location, we test for whether trial circuit choice is driven by
validity rates, and also for how the CAFC a®ected this choice. Propositions 1 and 2 form
the basis of our main tests of forum shopping.
4. The Data
Our data set of patent litigation uses and augments the Henry and Turner (2006) data.
Our decisions span 1953-2002, and include all United States utility patents found \invalid,"
\not infringed" or \valid and infringed" in a case whose opinion is recorded in the United
States Patents Quarterly (USPQ).22 The observational unit in the data set is a particular
patent in a particular case (a \patent case").23 There are 2890 patent cases in total.
22The USPQ contains all published opinions from cases involving patents, copyrights, and trademarks.
Federico (1956) estimates that the USPQ contains about half of US district court decisions for 1948-54.
23Thus, for a case with, say, four patents at issue, there are four patent cases. Note that in the analysis
presented here, the basic unit is a decision in a patent case.
11Many parts of this data set were originally gathered to study how courts have handled the
issues of patent validity and infringement. As such, our data include only cases that discuss
one or both issues. These criteria are discussed at length by Henry and Turner (2006, pp.
95-97). In the study described here, we restrict attention to utility patents and to validity.
When a court judges some of a patent's claims di®erently than it does others, we follow
Federico (1956) and distinguish such patents as follows. If any claim is held \valid and
infringed," the patent is recorded as \valid," no matter how many other claims are found
to be \invalid." The reason for this determination is that the patentee is winning something
from his patent. If there are no \valid and infringed" claims, then if any claim is held
\invalid" while others are held \not infringed," the patent is recorded as \invalid." If the
only adjudicated claims are held \not infringed," the patent is recorded as \valid."24 We
record variables pertaining to the litigation from published opinions on the cases,25 and
record variables pertaining to patent characteristics from the patent documents themselves,
archived by the USPTO.26
We assign each patent case to both a trial circuit and a home circuit. While this is the
most natural way to study non-uniformity and forum shopping among circuits in the pre-
CAFC era, for continuity, we maintain this level of aggregation for the CAFC era as well.
In any event, we do not have enough data to estimate accurate district-level validity rates
for most districts.
The trial circuit is the geographical circuit where the district court in the case is located.
As we are interested in the determinants of circuit choice, we omit observations with trial
circuits where the litigants do not have any choice about where to litigate. Thus, cases in the
US Courts of Claims or in the International Trade Commission are ignored.27 For continuity,
we combine Circuits Five and Eleven.28
24Patents are frequently held \valid but not infringed."
25We do not rely on the \particular patents" section in the USPQ annotation at the beginning of each
opinion. There are numerous inconsistencies between this and the body of the opinion, so we rely on the
latter.
26Patent number searches can be initiated here: http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/srchnum.htm.
27There are eighteen such observations. Eleven of these are patent cases decided in the US Court of Claims
(four \invalid," six \not infringed" and one \valid and infringed"), and seven of the cases were decided by
the International Trade Commission (one \invalid," three \not infringed" and three \valid and infringed").
Five of the ITC cases were decided in the pre-CAFC era (one\invalid", two \not infringed" and two "valid
and infringed"), when the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) was the relevant appellate court.
28The Eleventh Circuit was created in 1982, using the eastern part of the Fifth Circuit.
12In our data, we observe the geographic location of the patent assignee, and regard its
home circuit as the natural circuit. We say that the patent is \born" in the home circuit
and \litigated" in the trial circuit.29 Although jurisdiction is not guaranteed in the home
circuit as we de¯ne it, a priori it is more likely to be natural than any other circuit. Since
knowledge spillovers are localized (see Ja®e, Trajtenberg and Henderson 1993), we expect
that infringement will tend to be localized. Also, from the standpoint of the patentee,
litigating in the home circuit will typically cost less than litigating in other circuits. Travel
costs are low and the patentee's lawyers will typically be more familiar with nearby courts.
4.1. Circuit-level Descriptive Analysis
Many of our main results are evident in circuit-level analysis. Estimates of the probability
a patent is valid, broken down by case type and by trial circuit, are presented in Table 1.30
Consider ¯rst the estimated validity rates for patentee-plainti® cases in the pre-CAFC and
CAFC eras (columns 3 and 5 of the top part of Table 1). Due to the relatively small number
of cases, we omit the DC Circuit.
These statistics are shown in a scatterplot in Figure 1 and labeled by circuit.31 First,
each point indicates a greater likelihood of validity in the CAFC era for the district courts
in each trial circuit. This is not surprising in light of past work showing increased validity
rates under the CAFC.
Second, the variation in validity rates is much larger for the pre-CAFC era. The average
validity step, calculated by dividing the di®erence in the highest and lowest validity rates by
10, is .056 in the pre-CAFC era. This is more than three times larger than the .017 average
step for the CAFC era. The variance of the circuits' validity rates, .024, is about six times
as large as .004, the variance for the CAFC era.32
Third, circuits whose districts were \strong" on validity in the pre-CAFC maintained
those characteristics, somewhat, in the CAFC era. This is illustrated by the ¯tted line in
29If there is no assignee at issue, then we regard the ¯rst inventor as the assignee, and his location
determines the home circuit. Ideally, we would use the patentee's actual location at the time the case is
¯led, but this information is not available from the published opinions.
30All tables can be found at the end of the paper.
31All ¯gures are generated using STATA.
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Figure 1: Validity Rates, Patentee-Plainti® Cases, by Trial Circuit
Figure 1, obtained from a weighted OLS estimation of the CAFC-era validity rates on the
pre-CAFC-era validity rates.33 The estimated slope, .32, is statistically signi¯cant at the
10% level.34
Consider next Figures 2 and 3, which show con¯dence intervals around the average va-
lidity rate, by trial circuit, for the pre-CAFC and CAFC eras.35 There are far fewer overlaps
among the intervals in the pre-CAFC era.36 The con¯dence interval for the 3rd Circuit,
which has the lowest validity rate, overlaps with only one other interval (Circuit 1). The
con¯dence interval for the 10th Circuit, which has the highest validity rate, does not overlap
with any other intervals. By contrast, nearly all of the intervals overlap in the CAFC era
33Shares of observations per circuit were used as weights.
34The standard error is .17.
35Con¯dence intervals for circuit i; where i 2 f1;:::;10g, were computed at the 95% level around the
average validity rate for circuity i, using plus and minus 1.96 times the estimated standard deviation of the
validity variable for this circuit divided by
p
ni, where ni is the number of cases in circuit i.
36Note that our results are consistent with the arguments of Gambrell and Dunner about lack of uniformity
during the pre-CAFC era, but do not con¯rm the perception that the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh circuits were
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Figure 2: Validity Rates and Con¯dence Intervals, by Trial Circuit, Pre-
CAFC Era
(Figure 3). This re°ects the greater uniformity of the average validity rates across circuits.
Taken together, these results suggest signi¯cant non-uniformity in the pre-CAFC era and
a signi¯cant impact of the CAFC on validity outcomes. Namely, there is greater uniformity
in validity outcomes in patentee-plainti® cases in the CAFC era, but systematic di®erences
across circuits may remain. We investigate this further using a binary-choice model of
validity, below.
Consider next the relationship between validity rate and case location. We begin by
de¯ning a new measure, \net in°ow," for each circuit. Let hi be the number of patent
cases born in Circuit i and let li be the number of patent cases litigated in Circuit i. Let
H =
P10
i=1 hi be the total number of patent cases born in Circuits 1-10 and let L =
P10
i=1 li
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Figure 3: Average Validity and Con¯dence Intervals, by Trial Circuit, CAFC
Era
cases litigated in the ith Circuit less the share of total patent cases born in the ith Circuit.
If systematic forum shopping (for preferred venues on validity) prevails, then circuits that
are weak on validity should export cases to other circuits (so NI would tend to be negative).
Circuits that are strong on validity should import cases (so NI would tend to be positive).
Scatterplots of NI vs. validity rates are shown for the pre-CAFC and CAFC eras in Figure
4, along with ¯tted lines from weighted regressions.37
Two features of the ¯gure highlight forum shopping and the impact of the CAFC. First,
this ¯gure indicates that case migration (from home to trial circuit) is more concentrated
in the pre-CAFC era. The spread in net in°ow across circuits (plotted vertically) is much
greater in the pre-CAFC era. Circuits 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 each have, for the pre-CAFC era, net
in°ow that is larger, in absolute value, than net in°ow for every circuit in the CAFC era.
Second, the relationship between net in°ow and validity is consistent with the theory in
both eras but far stronger in the pre-CAFC era. The estimated slope coe±cient is .16 for
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Figure 4: Net In°ow vs. Validity Rate, by Geographical Circuit
the pre-CAFC-era ¯tted line, but only .03 for the CAFC-era ¯tted line. The former estimate
is of marginal statistical signi¯cance, while the latter is clearly insigni¯cant.38 In both cases
the 10th Circuit appears to be an extreme outlier, as it has a very high validity rate but a
low net in°ow. Most likely, this re°ects its geographic and economic remoteness (it spans
several sparsely-populated states in the interior midwest of the US), which tends to decrease
the incidence of patent infringement occurring there. In testing for forum shopping using
patent-case-level data, we can control for this circuit e®ect.
4.1.1. Patentee-Defendant Cases
The preceding descriptive results all pertain to patentee-plainti® cases only. The patterns
of validity rates are quite di®erent for patentee-defendant cases, where validity is about ten
percentage points less likely, on average, in both eras. In fact, validity rates in patentee-
defendant cases in the pre-CAFC era are not statistically correlated with validity rates in
38Estimated standard errors are .10 and .04, respectively.
17patentee-plainti® cases in the pre-CAFC era.39 This implies that whether a circuit is strong
on validity in patentee-plainti® cases is not correlated with whether it is strong in patentee-
defendant cases. The variance in validity rates, in the pre-CAFC era, is also low relative
to the variance in patentee-plainti® cases in the pre-CAFC era. This suggests that validity
rates were more uniform in patentee-defendant cases than in patentee-plainti® cases.40
These results suggest that the di®erences across circuits themselves di®er between patentee-
plainti® cases and patentee-defendant cases. A court's handling of the validity inquiry in
infringement (patentee-plainti®) actions is statistically distinct from its handling of validity
in declaratory judgment (patentee-defendant) actions. Pairing this with the relatively low
variance in validity rates for patentee-defendant cases in the pre-CAFC era, it appears that
forum shopping by alleged infringers was less valuable, and thus, less likely. This raises
the possibility that litigation disputes over venue may be driven in part by the advantage
conferred to the plainti®.
4.2. Litigation Characteristics
To test rigorously for uniformity across circuits in validity decisions, and to test for forum
shopping, we analyze our data at the patent-case level. This permits us to control for a large
number of patent- and litigation-speci¯c characteristics. A list of our variables, grouped into
¯ve categories, is shown in Table 2. The variable trial circuitj takes a value of 1 if the case is
litigated in circuit j, while home circuitj takes a value of 1 if the patent is born in circuit j.
The variable away circuit takes a value of 1 if the case is litigated outside the home circuit.
Filing dates are particularly important for the forum shopping estimations, because we
wish to test whether recent circuit-speci¯c validity rates help to explain the circuit chosen
at the time the case is ¯led. Unfortunately, these variables are not typically recorded in the
USPQ. We use two sources to identify ¯ling dates. If possible, we cross reference case docket
numbers in our USPQ data with docket numbers from the Inter-University Consortium
for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) Federal Judicial Center data on new litigation
39For example, in a regression of % valid (patentee-defendant cases) on % valid (patentee-plainti® cases),
the estimated slope is -.13 and the standard error is .25.
40The variance in pre-CAFC validity rates in patentee defendant cases is also low relative to the variance
in such cases in the CAFC era. Most likely, this is because there are relatively few observations from the
CAFC era.
18¯lings.41 The ICPSR data include the ¯ling day, month, and year. For cases in our data
that do not match any cases in the ICPSR data, where the docket number includes a two-
digit year modi¯er, we record the two-digit year from the docket number as the ¯ling year.
These modi¯ers are seldom observed in patent cases ¯led before the mid-1960s. In total, we
record ¯ling years for 1,580 observations.42
The variable home valid adv records the recent validity advantage of the home circuit
relative to the national average. It is constructed by subtracting the ¯ve-year rate of validity
for all circuits, valid rate5 all, from the ¯ve-year home rate, valid rate5 home.43 These
¯ve-year rates are lagged one year from the date of ¯ling. So, for a patent born in the
Fourth Circuit, upon which the patentee initiates litigation in 1974, home valid adv is the
validity rate for the Fourth Circuit for 1969-73 minus the aggregate validity rate for all
circuits for 1969-73. The reason we construct home valid adv this way is that, given the
structural break in overall validity rates at the onset of the CAFC (see Henry and Turner
2006), valid rate5 home is itself non-stationary. By subtracting valid rate5 all, we remove
the non-stationarity while retaining the key informational feature of the home validity rate,
namely its relationship to the overall rate.
The second key litigation variable, patentee defendant, takes a value of \1" if the paten-
tee is the defendant. This characterizes who names the forum. In the majority of cases where
patentee defendant = 1, the alleged infringer ¯les a declaratory judgment action against the
patentee.44 Given the di®ering origin of such cases, we continue to treat patentee-plainti®
and patentee-defendant cases separately in our patent-level analysis.
For the uniformity estimations, we assign each case to an era, based on the establishment
of the Federal Circuit. Where we observe a subsequent appellate decision, then the case is
41See footnote 20 for the reference for this data set.
42For several patent cases involving multiple patents, the ¯ling date occurs prior to the patent issue date,
indicating that the patent was added to the litigation after the ¯ling date. We remove these patent cases
from the analysis of forum shopping.




; where validt is the number of patents found valid in year
t, and Nt is the number of patents adjudicated in year t. This formulation allows for a well-de¯ned average
even for circuits that occasionally adjudicate no patents over the course of a year. In some cases, a circuit
had no decisions in the previous ¯ve years. These observations are recorded as missing.
44Exceptions occur in a handful of cases where both the plainti® and defendant own patents at issue in
the suit. The most common example of this is when a patentee sues for patent infringement, and the alleged
infringer counter claims for infringement.
19in the \CAFC era" if the CAFC hears the appeal, and in the \pre-CAFC era" otherwise.
If there is no appellate decision, we assign the case to the CAFC era if the decision occurs
after October 1982.
For the forum shopping estimations, we specify away circuit as the dependent variable.
Cases take an average of three years from ¯ling to reach a ¯rst decision, and the legislative
history of the CAFC played out over nearly a decade. Given this, there is no obvious way to
de¯ne the CAFC era based on ¯ling date. Thus, we de¯ne eras more °exibly in the forum
shopping estimations, using a set of time dummy variables.
The remaining litigation variables are straightforward. For our analysis of validity rates,
valid is our dependent variable. It takes on a value of \1" if the patent is not found invalid,
and \0" if the patent is found invalid. The variables decision age; which is the time elapsed
between patent issue and the decision in the case, and numpatents, the number of patents in
the case, are directly observable from the USPQ decisions. We record individual = 1 if the
patentee at litigation is a person or persons, while we record patentee assignee = 1 if the
patentee at litigation is very similar to the assignee. This includes cases where the assignee
is a person, and the patentee is a company, estate or trust whose name clearly references the
patentee.
4.3. Patent Characteristics
We sort patent characteristics, captured from the patent documents themselves, into
six sub-categories: Application, Assignee, Makeup, References and Vintage. Each variable
is directly observable in patent documents. The Application variables continuation and
division refer, respectively, to whether the patent is a continuation (in whole or in part)
or a division of a previous application. If a patent is either a continuation or a division, or
both, we use the earliest related application date to compute the patent pendency duration
variable delay.
Variables with basic characteristics of assignees and inventors are included in the As-
signee sub-category. The variable inventor assignee same state, which equals 1 if the in-
ventor and assignee reside in the same state, is not well-de¯ned when the patent assignee
is foreign, so there are fewer observations of this variable.45 The Makeup sub-category in-
45This variable is typically not well-de¯ned whenever away circuit is not well-de¯ned, but there are three
20cludes dummies for chemical;computer;drugs;electrical;mechanical and other; along with
the variable recording the number of claims. Product dummies are recorded consistent with
the NBER classi¯cation of Hall, Ja®e and Trajtenberg (2001).
In the Reference sub-category, all six variables re°ect backward references. These are
recorded on virtually all patents in our sample that are issued after January 1, 1947, but are
not recorded on earlier patents.46 The variables design refs;foreign refs and utility refs
record the number of design, foreign, and utility patents referenced, respectively. These
variables characterize both the size and composition of the prior art of the patent.47 The
duration variable oldest ref age records the elapsed time between the issue of the oldest
referenced patent and the issue of the subject patent. The similarly-constructed variable
median ref age records the elapsed time since the median-aged reference. Taken together,
these variables capture the age and time-concentration of the preceding technology. Forward
references are, unfortunately, prohibitively di±cult to measure for patents issued before
January 1, 1976.48 Since the disproportionate majority of patents litigated in the pre-CAFC
era were issued prior to this date, we do not attempt to study the importance of forward
citations.
The Vintage category includes a single variable, the issue year of the patent. As we see in
the next section, there are temporal trends in patent characteristics. This vintage variable
permits us to control for these trends.
4.4. Descriptive Statistics
The average patent in our sample has one or two American inventors and has an American
assignee at issue, both located in the same state. At the time of the district court decision,
patents tend to be about nine years old (from the date of issuance). The lag between patent
application and patent issuance is about three and one-half years. In our sample, patents
issue most commonly from an original application, as opposed to a continuation or division.
exceptions where away circuit is observed but inventor assignee same state is not observed. One patent
has a foreign inventor and an American assignee at issue. For two other patents, the state in which the
assignee resides is not clear but the circuit in which the assignee resides is clear.
46The net e®ect is that Reference variables are missing for 259 patent case observations.
47Reissue patent references here are treated as utility references.
48The USPTO has full-text HTML documents only for patents issued after this date. For earlier patents,
one must view the image. Thus, ¯nding all images that reference the litigated patent is infeasible.
21The typical patent references no US design patents, about seven US utility patents and one
foreign patent. Its oldest referenced patent was issued about 35 years prior to its own date
of issuance.
The patentee at trial is most commonly a company, not an individual, but that company
is typically the same as, or similar to, the inventor/assignee at issue,49 and litigates two
patents in the case. Patentees are the plainti® (and therefore choose the district court), for
just under 90% of patent cases. Roughly half of the trials in our sample take place in the
home circuit.
There are sizable di®erences between patents litigated in the pre-CAFC and CAFC eras,
although the di®erences are consistent with overall patenting trends. Table 3 gives statistics
for characteristics of patents litigated in the two eras, respectively, and also reports simple
z-statistics for di®erence-in-means tests across eras. Table 4 does the same for characteristics
of litigation.
In our sample, the distribution of patent birth in the CAFC era is di®erent from that of
the pre-CAFC era. Patents are signi¯cantly less likely to be born in the Second, Seventh
and DC Circuits, and signi¯cantly more likely to be born in the Ninth Circuit and abroad.
These changes re°ect demographic trends such as the declining relative population of New
York, the growing relative population of California, and the greater proportion of patents
issued to foreign assignees.50
In the CAFC era, applications of litigated patents have been about four times more likely
to be continuations and about 43% more likely to be divisions of earlier applications, but
there is no signi¯cant di®erence in delay. Thus, applications of CAFC-era litigated patents
(henceforth \CAFC-era patents") take about the same amount of time to issue, but undergo
signi¯cantly more recorded changes at the USPTO.
CAFC-era patents have, on average, about 26% more inventors, which is consistent with
greater average R&D per patent, a trend from the 1950s to 1980s noted by numerous re-
searchers.51 These patents also have about 43% more claims. The mix of patent product
49Under this de¯nition, the patentee either is exactly the same, is a company or trust in which the original
inventor/assignee or his heirs has clear ownership, or is a group of entities which includes the original
inventor/assignee.
50There are 11 observations where the birth location cannot be identi¯ed. Most of these involve assignees
that are companies with no given address.
51See Griliches (1990) for an excellent survey.
22characteristics is signi¯cantly di®erent across eras as well. Chemical, computer and drug
patents, covering products in growth industries, occur more frequently in the CAFC era,
while mechanical patents, more represented in industries in relative decline in this period,
occur less frequently.
CAFC-era patents, generally, have more backward references than pre-CAFC-era patents.
This fact is consistent with observed \citation in°ation" in patenting (Hall et al. 2001).
CAFC-era patents have about seven times more US design references (though the magnitudes
are quite small), 37% more US utility references, and more than twice as many foreign
references. The age of the technology, as measured by the median cited patent and oldest
cited patent, is smaller for CAFC-era patents, by about 21% under the former measure and
by about 5% under the latter, re°ecting faster rates of innovation.
On average, CAFC-era patents are a little more than half a year older when the cases are
¯led, but a little less than half a year older when the district court decides them. CAFC-era
cases are litigated with 17% more additional patents. The patentee at trial is about 27%
less likely to be an individual, but is equally likely to be the same as the inventor/assignee
at issue. The patentee is about 63% less likely to be the plainti® in the case in the CAFC
era, and is half as likely to have its patent invalidated.
5. Estimation
We estimate two models in this section. The ¯rst model speci¯es the determinants of
validity decisions. The second speci¯es the determinants of trial circuit choices.52
5.1. Uniformity of Validity Outcomes
We specify the validity model as follows:
valid
¤














j + "j; (5.1)
52All estimates in this paper are obtained by maximum likelihood using Time Series Processor (TSP).
Standard errors are computed using analytical second derivatives. Partial e®ects are computed using the
average of the partial e®ect for every observation.
23where valid¤ is a latent variable measuring the degree to which the patent satis¯es the
legal requirements for patentability. The subscript j indexes the patent cases and "j is
independently and identically distributed Normal with mean zero and constant variance.
This error term primarily re°ects unobservable factors determining patent validity, such as









j < 0 :
(5.2)
Here, the vector XEra
j includes only the dummy variable cafc eraj, XTrial
j is the vector of
trial circuit dummies, XHome
j is the vector of home circuit dummies, XLit
j is the vector of
litigation variables, and XPatent
j is the vector of patent variables.
We omit the Third Circuit dummy from XTrial
j and XHome
j . Conditional on this, the
elements f¯1;¯2;¯4;:::;¯10g that comprise the vector ¯ are di®erences in circuit e®ects for
the pre-CAFC era,53 while the elements of the vector µ are changes to these di®erences
wrought by the CAFC. Elements of the summed vector ¯+µ are di®erences in circuit e®ects
for the CAFC era. These parameters form the basis of our three key tests of uniformity.
Hypothesis 1. ¯ = 0.54 Validity rates are uniform across circuits in the pre-CAFC era,
ceteris paribus.55
Hypothesis 2. µ = 0: The e®ect of the CAFC on validity rates is the same across all
circuits, ceteris paribus.
Hypothesis 3. ¯ = ¡µ. Validity rates are uniform across circuits in the CAFC era, ceteris
paribus.
Conditional on the litigation era, we assume that circuit ¯xed e®ects are identical for
all patent cases. This is a key assumption for identi¯cation. Given the size and scope of
our data, we cannot control for all possible patent-circuit-speci¯c e®ects in estimating circuit
¯xed e®ects. Fortunately, estimated di®erences in circuit e®ects are similar to those obtained
53We omit the ¯fteen cases in the DC Circuit from this and ensuing estimations because of their relative
infrequency. We also do not impose a constant validity step here, in contrast to the theoretical model.
54Speci¯cally, ¯1 = ¯2 = ¯4 = ::: = ¯10 = 0: Subsequent hypotheses use notation analogously.
55The de¯nition of ¯ here is consistent with that in the earlier theory section.
24from the unconditional circuit validity rates in section 4, suggesting that any such e®ects are
negligible.
Based on the unconditional circuit validity rates discussed in section 4, inter-circuit dif-
ferences appear to be themselves di®erent in patentee-plainti® cases compared to patentee-
defendant cases. We control for this through sample segmentation. Our ¯rst estimation
includes only patentee-plainti® cases. Because we include Reference variables, and these are
missing for the oldest patents, our sample size is reduced further, to 2306 usable observa-
tions.56
The results are presented in Table 5. The McFadden R-squared is .14 and the model
yields about 66% correct predictions. The (omitted) Third Circuit is estimated to be the
weakest circuit with respect to validity in both eras because c ¯i > 0 and c ¯i > ¡b µi for all
i 2 f1;2;4;:::;10g. The Tenth Circuit is estimated to be the strongest in both eras, as b ¯10
is the highest of the elements of b ¯, and b ¯10 + b µ10 is the highest of the elements of b ¯ + b µ: The
partial e®ect associated with ¯10 indicates that, all else constant, a switch from the Third
Circuit to the Tenth Circuit in the pre-CAFC era results in an increased likelihood of patent
validity of .52. The partial e®ect associated with µ10; -.27 means that the same switch in the
CAFC era results in an increase in the likelihood of validity, .25, of less than half as much.
Hence, the spreads in validity rates for the two eras are estimated to be roughly consistent
with what we ¯nd in the aggregate statistics (.56 and .17, respectively).
We test Hypotheses 1-3 by computing likelihood ratio test statistics as ¡2(LR ¡ LU),
where LR is the restricted log-likelihood and LU is the unrestricted log-likelihood. The
statistic is asymptotically distributed Â2
q with q restrictions. For each of the following tests,
q = 9. For Hypothesis 1 (¯ = 0), the test statistic is 76.0 with a p-value of .000. Hence,
we fail to accept this hypothesis and conclude that the pre-CAFC era is characterized by
signi¯cant non-uniformity in validity outcomes.
For Hypothesis 2 (µ = 0), the test statistic is 15.0 with a p-value of .091. Hence, we fail
to accept this null hypothesis at the .10 signi¯cance level. We interpret this test as providing
weak evidence that the impact of the CAFC was heterogeneous across circuits.
For Hypothesis 3 (¯ = ¡µ), the test statistic is 21.2 with a p-value of .012. Hence, we fail
56The means and standard deviations of our variables are highly similar to the full sample.
25to accept this null hypothesis at the .05 signi¯cance level and conclude that the CAFC era
is also characterized by signi¯cant non-uniformity. However, the coe±cients in µ do o®set
those in ¯ to a degree, so that non-uniformity is decreased in the CAFC era.
The estimates on the home circuit dummies are all low and statistically insigni¯cant. This
indicates that the origin of a domestic case (home circuit) is not an important determinant
of validity, ceteris paribus.57 We do ¯nd that patents with foreign assignees are signi¯cantly
more likely to be found valid. The estimated partial e®ect is about .12. This is consistent
with Marco's (2004) estimate of ten percentage points.58
Other signi¯cant variables include the number of patents and the decision age of the
patent. In each case the coe±cient estimate (and hence the partial e®ect) is positive. Adding
one additional patent to the case increases the likelihood of validity by just over two percent-
age points. Adding one additional year of decision age results in just under a one percent
increase in the likelihood of validity. Both the number of patents and the duration of the
suit may relate to the size of the stakes for the patent holder.59
We also estimate the coe±cients in (5.1) for patentee-defendant cases and test Hypotheses
1-3. Because of the small sample size, we are forced to drop all Tenth Circuit dummy
variables and observations (home and trial circuit) to achieve convergence. Only hypothesis
3 is rejected.60 Hence, consistent with the discussion of Figure 2 earlier, there is no evidence
of systematic di®erences across circuits in validity decisions in patentee-defendant cases in the
pre-CAFC era. There is some evidence for systematic di®erences across circuits in the CAFC
era. Because of the small sample size (274 observations) and a general lack of statistically
57We interpret this as strong evidence that forum shopping, if it exists, does not introduce selection biases
to circuit validity rates. Our estimations indicate, for example, that the likelihood of validity does not
signi¯cantly change if the home circuit changes from the Third, which is an unfavorable trial circuit and
therefore a relatively likely source of shopped patent cases, to the Fifth, a relatively unlikely source.
58Marco's data span pre-CAFC and CAFC eras (1977-97), but the sample is limited to publicly held
patentees. The estimates are statistically insigni¯cant in some speci¯cations. Studying a small sample from
1989-96, Allison and Lemley (1998) ¯nd that foreign litigants have lower rates of success. Moore (2003) ¯nds
similar results for data from 1983-99.
59The theoretical results of Priest and Klein (1984) suggest that as more disputes are litigated, the win
rate will be closer to the population win rate, and less subject to the 50% self-selection bias of litigated cases.
Higher stakes generally increase the litigation rate, ceteris paribus. We can expect that the \population"
win rate of patents will be above 50% for validity, given the presumption of validity held by the courts. We
can also expect that litigating a greater number of patents may indicate greater stakes for the patentee, and
because of those stakes, the duration of the suit will increase.
60For hypothesis 1, the likelihood ratio statistic is 7.6, for a p-value of .476. For hypothesis 2, the likelihood
ratio statistic is 7.2, for a p-value of .518. For hypothesis 3, the likelihood ratio statistic is 17.8, for a p-value
of .022.
26signi¯cant independent variables, we do not place great weight on these ¯ndings.61
5.2. Forum Shopping
We specify the circuit choice model as follows:
away circuit
¤












where away circuit¤ is a latent variable measuring the degree to which the patentee prefers
to litigate outside the home circuit. The error "j, independently and identically distributed
Normal with mean zero and constant variance, primarily re°ects unobservable random fac-





1 if away circuit¤
j ¸ 0
0 if away circuit¤
j < 0 :
(5.4)
Using a circuit-location dummy as the dependent variable necessitates some important
adjustments to the regressors from (5.1). First, we specify XEra
j as a set of time dummies
from 1963-96, fyr63¡67;j;yr68¡72;j;yr73¡77;j;yr78¡82;j;yr83¡87;j;yr88¡92;j;yr93¡96;jg, where the
subscript represents a window of ¯ling years. We cannot say, a priori, when patentees
began anticipating that the CAFC would be the likely appeals court. The legislative history
of attempts to create the CAFC date to the early 1970s, there were numerous di®erent
proposals for precisely how to restructure the courts, and the average time between ¯ling
an infringement suit and a ¯rst decision is around 3 years. Hence, even if the CAFC did
mitigate forum shopping, it is an open empirical question when that mitigation began. We
speci¯cally place 1982 and 1983 in di®erent dummy categories to capture possible immediate
e®ects of the CAFC. We also wish to identify any changes in circuit location due to the 1988
legislative changes in venue statutes, con¯rmed by the CAFC in the 1990 VE Holding Corp.
case.
61We also do not report the full results of this estimation for this reason. They are available from the
authors on request.
62We rely on a binary-choice model because of a technical constraint|a ten-choice multinomial probit
model, with circuit as the dependent variable, fails to converge.
27Second, the variable home valid adv is added as an explanatory variable. Our basic test
of forum shopping is whether patentees systematically litigate at home when home districts
have recently been favorable on validity and litigate away from home when home districts
have been unfavorable. Thus, we estimate the e®ect of home valid adv on away circuit and
test for its signi¯cance.63 To test for temporal changes in forum shopping, we interact this
variable with a set of time dummies. We test the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4. Ã = 0: Recent home-circuit validity rates are not asociated with the likeli-
hood the home circuit is chosen as the trial circuit, ceteris paribus.
The third change is that away circuit is simultaneously determined with the trial circuit,
so we omit the endogenous trial circuit dummies from the right-hand side and adjust our
other variables accordingly to obtain a reduced-form equation. In this speci¯cation, XLit
excludes decision age but includes filing age and XPatent remains the same as in (5.1). The
home circuit dummies fXHome
j g measure ¯xed e®ects on location choice, i.e., characteristics
that a®ect the set of available circuits in which the patentee could choose to litigate but do
not a®ect validity rates. By controlling for these, we can test Proposition 2.
Using away circuit as the dependent variable also necessitates some changes to the sam-
ple, because the basis for the data set is decisions recorded in the USPQ. Cases take three
years on average to reach a ¯rst decision, so we have very few observations for the last few
years in the set. To avoid sample selection biases,64 we trim the data and restrict attention
to patent cases with ¯ling years through 1996.65 We choose a six-year cuto® because it is
the minimum interval in which over 90% of cases in our data reach a ¯rst decision. We also
omit, for symmetry, a handful of observations with ¯ling years prior to 1963.66
Finally, the key variable home valid adv is well-de¯ned only for domestically assigned
patents. Foreign-assigned patents do not have a home circuit as we de¯ne them here. This
further restricts our sample size.
63We assume that additional information about validity rates, used by the patentee to decide whether to
litigate at home, is uncorrelated with the information re°ected in home valid adv.
64An obvious possibility is that home cases might ¯nish more quickly.
65This is the reason the ¯nal time dummy spans only 4 years (1993-96), in contrast to the ¯ve-year windows
for other dummies.
66Given that the ICPSR data start in 1970 and nearly every case there was ¯led in 1969 or earlier, we use
1969 as the basis for going back six years.
28In our ¯rst estimation, we restrict attention to patentee-plainti® cases. This, and the
other constraints discussed above, limit our sample size to 1200 observations.67 We omit
yr78¡82 from the right-hand side, so the coe±cients on the year dummies are interpreted
relative to the 1978-82 period.
The results of this estimation are given in Table 6. The McFadden R-squared is .12
and the model yields about 65% correct predictions. The coe±cient estimates on the three
earliest ´ dummies are negative and, for ´63¡67 and ´73¡77, signi¯cantly di®erent from zero.
Our interpretation of these estimates is that greater travel costs during the earlier years of
the sample made patentees less inclined to litigate far away from home.
Next, consider the tests of forum shopping on the basis of validity rates. Estimates for
the elements of Ã, the home valid adv ¤ XEra parameters, are in the lower part of Table
6 (note that the subscript gives the ¯ling window). For the 1963-67, 1968-72 and 1973-77
windows, the estimate is negative and signi¯cant. This implies that if a home-circuit validity
rate is higher, relative to the average across all circuits, then the patentee is more likely to
¯le its suit in the home circuit. The average partial e®ects imply that, for the 1963-67, 1968-
72 and 1973-77 periods, a 10 percentage point increase in the home advantage is associated
with roughly a 9, 5 and 7 point increase, respectively, in the likelihood that the case is
litigated in the home circuit. For the dummies representing 1978 and later, the estimates
vary considerably and are not statistically signi¯cant. Three of the four estimates are far
lower in absolute value as well.
These results strongly indicate that through 1977 patentees systematically locate cases in
home districts when those districts are strong, but do so to a far lesser extent, and perhaps
not at all, from 1978 on. That is, there was signi¯cant forum shopping on the basis of validity
rates in the pre-CAFC era, but not in the CAFC era. We also ¯nd that such forum shopping
appears to cease several years prior to the CAFC's establishment in 1982, suggesting that
patentees anticipated both its establishment its impact. We ¯nd no evidence of signi¯cant
changes in case location or forum shopping after 1988. Hence, our data indicate that the
legislative changes to the venue statute in 1988 and the CAFC's 1990 VE Holding Corp.
ruling had no signi¯cant impact.
The 1963-77 results are consistent with some of the major conclusions about patentees
67The means and standard deviations of our variables are highly similar to the full sample.
29reached by Dunner and Gambrell in the 1975 Hruska Commission report, and are also
consistent with Proposition 2. The ¯nding that the CAFC mitigates the incidence of forum
shopping is consistent with Proposition 1.
In determining away circuit, we expect the most signi¯cant home circuit ¯xed e®ects
to be geography, population and speed of case resolution. Speci¯cally, patents in home
circuits far from other circuits have higher travel costs of shopping, so such patents should
be characterized by a greater probability of staying home for litigation. However, if a circuit
has low population, and thus a low level of economic activity, the likelihood that products
are marketed in that circuit, and that infringement occurs there, is lower as well. Finally,
quick circuits should also be more popular.
By and large, these circuit e®ects are small. Only one circuit, the Tenth, has a statistically
signi¯cant e®ect. This negative e®ect is not surprising, as this circuit is both remote from
other circuits and has low population. Patents born in this circuit are litigated elsewhere
with .34 greater likelihood. This helps to explain why the Tenth Circuit appears to be a
statistical outlier in Figure 4.
Other signi¯cant determinants of away circuit are inventor assignee same state and
patentee assignee. Each of these variables pertains to the research and development capacity
of the inventor, assignee and patentee. If the patent is assigned to an entity located in the
same state, this indicates a relatively localized inventive activity complex, so the patent case
should be more likely to stay at home. When the patentee is the same as the assignee, the
patent has not changed hands. Since purchasers of patents typically have more resources than
sellers, it is to be expected that patentee assignee = 1 is associated with a higher probability
that the case is litigated in a home circuit district. Both variables are estimated to be
negative and signi¯cant. The partial e®ects imply that assignees whose patents were invented
locally are about 14 percentage points less likely to litigate away from home, and patentees
who maintain ownership of their patents throughout the patent's life are an additional 7
percentage points less likely to litigate away from home.
Next, we estimate (5.4) with patentee-defendant cases included. This brings our sample
size up to 1336. Results from this estimation are presented in Table 7. Despite the greater
sample size and larger number of independent variables, the R-squared (.12) and fraction
of correct predictions (.64) are lower than in the previous estimation. Our forum shopping
30results for patentee-plainti® cases are robust to this speci¯cation. The coe±cient estimates
on the home valid adv¤XEra parameters for the 1963-67, 1968-72 and 1973-77 time windows
are nearly identical to those in Table 6, as are the standard errors.
We control for patentee-defendant cases using the dummy patentee defendant and inter-
actions between this variable, the era dummies, and home valid adv: Our theoretical model
predicts that, in a forum-shopping equilibrium, signs should be positive, as alleged infringers
will wish to avoid circuits favorable to patentees. Five of the seven dummy estimates are
indeed positive, consistent with the theory. None are statistically signi¯cant at the .05 level,
however. The standard errors are quite large, due in part to the relatively small number
of observations of patentee-defendant cases. Hence, we conclude that there is very little
evidence for forum shopping in patentee-defendant cases.
6. Discussion
The establishment of the Federal Circuit represents a sea change in the federal judiciary.
For the ¯rst time a single court oversees district decisions for the speci¯c subject matter of
patents. Because of this, the CAFC provides a unique opportunity to examine the causes
and consequences of non-uniformity in the judiciary. Our analysis is the ¯rst to directly
investigate uniformity and forum shopping in litigation under both decentralized (pre-CAFC)
and centralized (CAFC) regimes. Examining both eras is critical for understanding the role
of the federal court system and for understanding the clear association between uniformity
and forum shopping.
We conclude that, in patentee-plainti® cases, there was signi¯cant non-uniformity in
validity outcomes across US geographical circuits in the pre-CAFC era, and signi¯cant forum
shopping. In the CAFC era, systematic non-uniformity across circuits remains, but it is much
smaller in magnitude. Forum shopping on the basis of validity rates appears to have been
mitigated. We estimate 1978 as the end of systematic circuit forum shopping on the basis
of validity.
We also ¯nd no evidence of systematic non-uniformity across circuits in patentee-defendant
cases in the pre-CAFC era, and no strong evidence for forum shopping in those cases either.
Unconditional validity rates in patentee-plainti® cases are about ten percentage points higher
31than in patentee-defendant cases, in both the pre-CAFC and CAFC eras. While the rela-
tively small amount of data used to reach these conclusions makes us reluctant to place great
weight on them, the results do suggest a possible alternative interpretation for jurisdictional
battles. One possibility is that in the pre-CAFC era, patentees had the incentive both to
forum shop and to be the plainti®, while alleged infringers had only the incentive to be
the plainti®.68 Hence, venue disputes could be common even with asymmetric incentives to
forum shop.
Much of the rhetoric supporting the establishment of the CAFC criticized the practice
of forum shopping. We believe that some of this rhetoric may have been misplaced, in that
the root cause of the forum shopping was the non-uniformity of validity outcomes. Forum
shopping is not an ill, in and of itself, but is a symptom of non-uniformity.
Viewed broadly, our results suggest that in the CAFC era the outcome of patent litigation
has been more predictable and the decision of where to litigate has been simpler. That is,
patentees have faced reduced risks associated with the uncertainty of litigation and reduced
search costs for judicial fora. These apparent bene¯ts have come at the cost of reduced
judicial experimentation and greater risk of judicial \tunnel vision" by the specialized judges
of the CAFC.69 Additionally, the amount of patent litigation has surged in the CAFC era
(Bessen and Meurer 2005, 2008), suggesting a higher aggregate expense associated with
patent disputes. Not surprisingly, the establishment of the CAFC remains controversial
(Ja®e and Lerner 2004). Assessing the net welfare e®ect of this centralization of the judiciary
represents an important challenge for future research.
References
Allison, John R. and Mark A. Lemley. 1998. Empirical Evidence of the Validity of Litigated
Patents. AIPLA Quarterly Journal 26:185-275.
Bessen, James and Michael Meurer. 2005. The Patent Litigation Explosion. Boston Univer-
sity Working Paper No. 05-18.
68Recall that the structure of the law ensures that infringers cannot unilaterally bring a suit.
6967 F.R.D. 195, 234-35. See Scherer (2006).
32Bessen, James and Michael Meurer. 2008. Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureacrats and
Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ.
Clermont, Kevin M. and Theodore Eisenberg. 1992. Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending
Empiricism. Cornell Law Review 77:1124-77.
Clermont, Kevin M. and Theodore Eisenberg. 1995. Exorcising the Evils of Forum Shopping.
Cornell Law Review 80:1507-35.
Dreyfuss, Rochelle Cooper. 1989. The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts.
New York University Law Review 64:1-78.
Federico, P.J. 1956. Adjudicated Patents, 1948-54. Journal of the Patent O±ce Society
38:233-49.
Goldstein, Paul. 1993. Copyright, Patent, Trademark and Related State Doctrines: Cases and
Materials on the Law of Intellectual Property. Westbury, New York: The Foundation
Press, Inc.
Griliches, Zvi. 1990. Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey. Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature 28:1661-1707.
Hall, Bronwyn H. 2005. Exploring the Patent Explosion. Journal of Technology Transfer
30:35-48.
Hall, B. H., A. B. Ja®e, and M. Tratjenberg. 2001. The NBER Patent Citation Data File:
Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools. NBER Working Paper 8498.
Hall, Bronwyn H. and Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis. 2001. The Patent Paradox Revisited: An
Empirical Study of Patenting in the US Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995. RAND
Journal of Economics 32:101-28.
Harmon, Robert L. 1992. Seven New Rules of Thumb: How the Federal Circuit Has
Changed the Way Patent Lawyers Advise Clients. George Mason University Law
Review 14:573-84.
Harmon, Robert L. 2003. Patents and the Federal Circuit, 6th ed. Washington, DC: BNA,
pp. 532-544.
Henry, Matthew and John L. Turner. 2006. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's
33Impact on Patent Litigation. Journal of Legal Studies 35:85-117.
Ja®e, Adam and Josh Lerner. 2004. Innovation and Its Discontents: How Our Broken Patent
System is Endangering Innovation and Progress, and What to Do About It. Princeton,
NJ and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press.
Ja®e, Adam, Manuel Trajtenberg and Rebecca Henderson. 1993. Geographic Localization
of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 108:577-98.
Kastriner, Lawrence G. 1991. The Revival of Con¯dence in the Patent System. Journal of
the Patent and Trademark Society 73:5-23.
Keller, Michael L. and Kenneth J. Nunnenkamp. 1991. Area Summary: Patent Law Devel-
opments in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit During 1990.
Am. U. L. Rev. 40:1157-1220.
Kessler, Daniel, Thomas Meites and Geo®rey Miller. 1996. Explaining Deviations from the
Fifty Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation.
Journal of Legal Studies 25:233-59.
Koenig, Gloria. 1980. Patent Invalidity: A Statistical and Substantive Analysis. New York,
NY: Clark Boardman Company.
Kortum, Samuel and Josh Lerner. 1998. Stronger Protection or Technological Revolution:
What Is Behind the Recent Surge in Patenting? Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public
Policy 48:247-304.
Lerner, Josh and Jean Tirole. 2006. A Model of Forum Shopping. American Economic Review
96:1091-1113.
Marco, Alan C. 2004. The Selection E®ects (and Lack Thereof) in Patent Litigation: Evi-
dence from Trials. The BE Journals in Economic Analysis & Policy 4:article 21.
Merges, Robert P. 1997. Patent Law and Policy. Charlottesville, VA: MICHIE Law Publish-
ers.
Merz, Jon F. and Nicholas M. Pace. 1994. Trends in Patent Litigation: The Apparent
In°uence of Strengthened Patents Attributable to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. Journal of the Patent and Trademark O±ce Society 76:579-90.
34Moore, Kimberly. 2001. Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice A®ect
Innovation? North Carolina Law Review 79:889-935.
Moore, Kimberly. 2003. Xenophobia in American Courts. Northwestern University Law Re-
view 97:1497-1550.
Perlo®, Je®rey L., Daniel L. Rubinfeld and Paul Ruud. 1996. Antitrust Settlements and Trial
Outcomes. Review of Economics and Statistics 78:401-09.
Priest, George L. and Benjamin Klein. 1984. The Selection of Disputes for Litigation. Journal
of Legal Studies 13:1-55.
Quillen, Jr., Cecil D. 1993. Proposal for the Simpli¯cation and Reform of the United States
Patent System. AIPLA Quarterly Journal 21:189-212.
Scherer, F.M. 2006. The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United States.
AEI-Brookings Working Paper 06-22.
Turner, John L. 2005. In Defense of the Patent Friendly Court Hypothesis: Theory and
Evidence. Unpublished manuscript. University of Georgia, Department of Economics,
April.
Wille, David. 1991. Personal Jurisdiction over Aliens in Patent Infringement Actions: A
Uniform Approach toward the Situs of the Tort. Michigan Law Review 90:658-681.
35Table 1: VALIDITY PROBABILITIES
Pre-CAFC CAFC
Circuit N Not Invalid N Not Invalid
Patentee-Plainti® Cases
First 103 :340 47 :766
Second 217 :401 93 :774
Third 192 :250 111 :640
Fourth 156 :519 59 :797
Fifth 198 :601 75 :827
Sixth 180 :394 107 :673
Seventh 357 :499 86 :663
Eighth 92 :424 34 :706
Ninth 218 :491 149 :779
Tenth 48 :813 21 :810
DC 5 :200 0 n/a
Sub-Total 1;766 :456 782 :734
Patentee-Defendant Cases
First 23 :522 4 :750
Second 60 :350 7 :286
Third 33 :273 12 :833
Fourth 14 :571 5 :800
Fifth 13 :385 5 :800
Sixth 33 :303 8 :625
Seventh 23 :435 14 :643
Eighth 14 :357 4 :250
Ninth 36 :250 11 :445
Tenth 13 :231 0 n/a
DC 8 :500 2 1:000
Sub-Total 270 :356 72 :625
Total 2036 :443 854 :725
Note: The numbers in this table re°ect all district court validity decisions in US patent cases, during 1953-
2002, whose opinions are published in the United States Patents Quarterly. If the patentee ¯les the case, then
it is regarded as the plainti®. If the alleged infringer or patent challenger ¯les the case, then the patentee is
regarded as the defendant.
36Table 2: VARIABLES
Category
variable Units Sub-category Description
Circuit Dummies
trial circuitj 0/1 \1" if district court is in geographical circuit j.
home circuitj 0/1 \1" if assignee is in geographical circuit j.
away circuit 0/1 \1" if patent case not in \home" circuit.
Era Dummies
cafc era 0/1 \1" if the CAFC is the relevant appeals court.
Litigation
decision age years years from patent issue to decision date.
¯ling age years years from patent issue to ¯ling date.
individual 0/1 \1" if patentee is an individual.
numpats count number of patents in the case.
patentee assignee 0/1 \1" if patentee is the same or similar to assignee.
patentee defendant 0/1 \1" if patentee is the defendant.
valid 0/1 \1" if patent not found invalid.
Patent
continuation 0/1 application \1" if application is a continuation.
division 0/1 application \1" if application is a division.
issue delay years application time from ¯rst application to patent issue.
assigned 0/1 assignee \1" if patent is assigned at issue.
inventor assignee same state 0/1 assignee \1" if assignee in same state as inventor.
numinventors count assignee number of inventors.
chemical 0/1 makeup \1" if product code in NBER \chemical" category.
computer 0/1 makeup \1" if product code in NBER \computer" category.
drugs 0/1 makeup \1" if product code in NBER \drugs" category.
electrical 0/1 makeup \1" if product code in NBER \electrical" category.
mechanical 0/1 makeup \1" if product code in NBER \mechanical" category.
other 0/1 makeup \1" if product code not in any NBER category.
numclaims count makeup number of claims.
design refs count reference number of backward US design patent references.
foreign refs count reference number of backward foreign patent references.
median ref age years reference time since issue of median backward patent reference.
oldest ref age years reference time since issue of oldest backward patent reference.
utility refs count reference number of backward US utility patent references.
issue year year vintage year of patent issue.
Validity Rates
valid rate5 all [0,1] previous 5 years' avg. validity rate in all circuits.
valid rate5 home [0,1] previous 5 years' avg. validity rate in the home circuit.
home valid adv [-1,1] valid rate5 home - valid rate5 all.
Note: The source for these data is all of the patents in all district court validity decisions in US patent
cases, during 1953-2002, whose opinions are published in the United States Patents Quarterly. The variables
in the Circuit Dummies, Era Dummies and Litigation categories are recorded from the opinions. We use
these variables to construct variables in the Validity Rates category. The variables in the Patent category
come from the US patent documents, which are archived by the USPTO and can be searched by number at
http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/srchnum.htm.
37Table 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS - PATENT CHARACTERISTICS
Category Pre-CAFC CAFC DIM
variable N Mean SD N Mean SD z
Birth
home circuit1 2026 0:06 (0:24) 853 0:06 (0:24) ¡0:01
home circuit2 2026 0:18 (0:38) 853 0:11 (0:31) ¡4:97
home circuit3 2026 0:12 (0:32) 853 0:12 (0:32) 0:15
home circuit4 2026 0:04 (0:18) 853 0:04 (0:20) 0:61
home circuit5 2026 0:07 (0:25) 853 0:08 (0:27) 1:15
home circuit6 2026 0:12 (0:33) 853 0:11 (0:32) ¡0:79
home circuit7 2026 0:15 (0:35) 853 0:11 (0:31) ¡3:13
home circuit8 2026 0:06 (0:24) 853 0:05 (0:21) ¡1:63
home circuit9 2026 0:12 (0:32) 853 0:17 (0:37) 3:17
home circuit10 2026 0:04 (0:19) 853 0:04 (0:20) 0:69
home circuitDC 2026 0:01 (0:09) 853 0:00 (0:05) ¡2:00
home circuitForeign 2026 0:05 (0:23) 853 0:12 (0:33) 5:62
Application
continuation 2036 0:09 (0:29) 854 0:36 (0:48) 14:97
delay 2036 3:55 (2:39) 854 3:51 (2:89) ¡0:34
division 2036 0:07 (0:25) 854 0:10 (0:30) 2:72
Assignee/Inventor
assigned 2036 0:64 (0:48) 854 0:74 (0:44) 5:58
inventor assignee same state 1912 0:84 (0:37) 748 0:81 (0:39) ¡1:66
numinventors 2036 1:33 (0:64) 854 1:69 (1:01) 9:60
Makeup
chemical 2036 0:14 (0:35) 854 0:17 (0:37) 1:87
computer 2036 0:04 (0:18) 854 0:09 (0:29) 5:16
drugs 2036 0:03 (0:18) 854 0:16 (0:36) 9:53
electrical 2036 0:10 (0:30) 854 0:11 (0:31) 0:69
mechanical 2036 0:26 (0:44) 854 0:20 (0:40) ¡3:21
other 2036 0:43 (0:50) 854 0:27 (0:44) ¡8:75
numclaims 2036 10:38 (10:80) 854 14:91 (13:36) 8:79
References
design refs 1777 0:01 (0:08) 854 0:08 (0:87) 2:38
foreign refs 1777 0:68 (1:22) 854 1:50 (3:77) 6:18
median ref age 1777 13:40 (10:84) 854 11:10 (9:64) ¡5:49
oldest ref age 1777 35:70 (23:30) 854 33:92 (27:99) ¡1:61
utility refs 1777 6:39 (4:38) 854 8:94 (11:50) 6:28
Note: The source for these data is all of the patents in all district court validity decisions in US patent
cases, during 1953-2002, whose opinions are published in the United States Patents Quarterly. The variables
recorded in this table come from the US patent documents, which are archived by the USPTO and can be
searched by number at http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/srchnum.htm.
38Table 4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS - LITIGATION CHARACTERISTICS
Pre-CAFC CAFC DIM
variable N Mean SD N Mean SD z
away circuit 1915 0:55 (0:50) 748 0:49 (0:50) ¡2:77
decision age 2036 8:59 (5:27) 854 8:93 (5:36) 1:57
¯ling age 761 5:49 (4:42) 819 6:28 (4:92) 3:38
individual 2036 0:14 (0:35) 854 0:11 (0:31) ¡2:35
numpats 2036 1:93 (1:45) 854 2:10 (1:90) 2:38
patentee assignee 2036 0:68 (0:47) 854 0:70 (0:46) 1:19
patentee defendant 2036 0:13 (0:34) 854 0:08 (0:28) ¡3:98
valid 2036 0:44 (0:50) 854 0:72 (0:45) 14:98
Note: The source for these data is all district court validity decisions in US patent cases, during 1953-2002,
whose opinions are published in the United States Patents Quarterly. The variables recorded in this table
come from the text of the opinions.
39Table 5: UNIFORMITY ESTIMATION
(Eq. (5.1): Patentee-Plainti® Cases Only)
Dependent Variable: Valid
Parameter Value (Std. Error) Partial E®ect
constant 7.5786 ( 8.2874) 2.6572
trial circuit1 0.2478 ( 0.1903) 0.0869
trial circuit2 0.3206 ( 0.1490)¤ 0.1124
trial circuit4 0.5063 ( 0.1640)¤ 0.1775
trial circuit5 0.9708 ( 0.1537)¤ 0.3404
trial circuit6 0.4150 ( 0.1610)¤ 0.1455
trial circuit7 0.6367 ( 0.1386)¤ 0.2232
trial circuit8 0.2595 ( 0.1920) 0.0910
trial circuit9 0.6817 ( 0.1534)¤ 0.2390
trial circuit10 1.4876 ( 0.2470)¤ 0.5216
numpatents 0.0443 ( 0.0200)¤ 0.0155
cafc era 0.8922 ( 0.1894)¤ 0.3128
cafc trial circuit1 0.0254 ( 0.3057) 0.0089
cafc trial circuit2 0.1702 ( 0.2442) 0.0597
cafc trial circuit4 0.0405 ( 0.2785) 0.0142
cafc trial circuit5 -0.3126 ( 0.2619) -0.1096
cafc trial circuit6 -0.2683 ( 0.2388) -0.0941
cafc trial circuit7 -0.5277 ( 0.2328)¤ -0.1850
cafc trial circuit8 0.0742 ( 0.3282) 0.0260
cafc trial circuit9 -0.1168 ( 0.2275) -0.0410
cafc trial circuit10 -0.7744 ( 0.4308) -0.2715
home circuit1 0.2958 ( 0.1582) 0.1037
home circuit2 0.0602 ( 0.1126) 0.0211
home circuit4 0.1372 ( 0.1721) 0.0481
home circuit5 -0.1066 ( 0.1403) -0.0374
home circuit6 0.0641 ( 0.1221) 0.0225
home circuit7 0.1123 ( 0.1165) 0.0394
home circuit8 0.0030 ( 0.1484) 0.0011
home circuit9 -0.0165 ( 0.1215) -0.0058
home circuit10 -0.0048 ( 0.1728) -0.0017
home circuitForeign 0.3491 ( 0.1366)¤ 0.1224
numclaims 0.0051 ( 0.0029) 0.0018
decision age 0.0204 ( 0.0067)¤ 0.0071
Note: asterisk indicates signi¯cance at the .05 level. Additional variables included
in the model were chemical, computer, drugs, electrical, issue-year, mechani-
cal, numclaims, continuation, delay, division, assigned, numinventors, individual,
design-refs, foreign-refs, utility-refs, median-ref-age, oldest-ref-age, and ¯ling-age.
40Table 6: FORUM SHOPPING ESTIMATION
(Eq. (5.3): Patentee-Plainti® Cases Only)
Dependent Variable: Away-Circuit
Parameter Value (Std. Error) Partial E®ect
constant 70.6601 (56.4051) 25.1699
home circuit1 -0.1999 ( 0.2080) -0.0712
home circuit2 -0.1857 ( 0.1552) -0.0662
home circuit4 0.3845 ( 0.2386) 0.1370
home circuit5 0.2246 ( 0.1997) 0.0800
home circuit6 -0.0694 ( 0.1633) -0.0247
home circuit7 -0.2144 ( 0.1679) -0.0764
home circuit8 0.3331 ( 0.2042) 0.1187
home circuit9 -0.2154 ( 0.1591) -0.0767
home circuit10 1.1706 ( 0.2662)¤ 0.4170
yr63¡67 -1.0003 ( 0.4436)¤ -0.3563
yr68¡72 -0.3515 ( 0.3074) -0.1252
yr73¡77 -0.3898 ( 0.1952)¤ -0.1388
yr83¡87 0.0971 ( 0.2038) 0.0346
yr88¡92 -0.1357 ( 0.3251) -0.0483
yr93¡96 0.2485 ( 0.4379) 0.0885
inventor assignee same state -0.4062 ( 0.1055)¤ -0.1447
patentee assignee -0.1932 ( 0.0915)¤ -0.0688
home valid adv63¡67 -2.5158 ( 0.8310)¤ -0.8962
home valid adv68¡72 -1.4449 ( 0.7105)¤ -0.5147
home valid adv73¡77 -1.8852 ( 0.7036)¤ -0.6715
home valid adv78¡82 0.0869 ( 1.0529) 0.0310
home valid adv83¡87 -0.6238 ( 0.6264) -0.2222
home valid adv88¡92 -1.5383 ( 1.1274) -0.5480
home valid adv93¡96 0.1583 ( 1.9452) 0.0564
Note: asterisk indicates signi¯cance at the .05 level. Additional variables included
in the model were chemical, computer, drugs, electrical, issue-year, mechani-
cal, numclaims, continuation, delay, division, assigned, numinventors, individual,
design-refs, foreign-refs, median-ref-age, oldest-ref-age, utility-refs, and decision-
age.
41Table 7: FORUM SHOPPING ESTIMATION
(Eq. (5.3): All Cases)
Dependent Variable: Away-Circuit
Parameter Value (Std. Error) Partial E®ect
constant 31.0602 (53.4035) 11.1115
home circuit1 -0.1928 ( 0.1975) -0.0690
home circuit2 -0.2960 ( 0.1472)¤ -0.1059
home circuit4 0.2968 ( 0.2274) 0.1062
home circuit5 0.1504 ( 0.1916) 0.0538
home circuit6 -0.0760 ( 0.1555) -0.0272
home circuit7 -0.2097 ( 0.1589) -0.0750
home circuit8 0.2462 ( 0.1944) 0.0881
home circuit9 -0.2529 ( 0.1522) -0.0905
home circuit10 0.9369 ( 0.2480)¤ 0.3352
yr63¡67 -0.6490 ( 0.4181) -0.2322
yr68¡72 -0.1669 ( 0.2885) -0.0597
yr73¡77 -0.2877 ( 0.1825) -0.1029
yr83¡87 0.0437 ( 0.1944) 0.0156
yr88¡92 -0.3086 ( 0.3096) -0.1104
yr93¡96 -0.0393 ( 0.4171) -0.0141
inventor assignee same state -0.4128 ( 0.0998)¤ -0.1477
patentee assignee -0.2212 ( 0.0864)¤ -0.0791
home valid adv63¡67 -2.2593 ( 0.8138)¤ -0.8083
home valid adv68¡72 -1.4946 ( 0.6935)¤ -0.5347
home valid adv73¡77 -1.8623 ( 0.6867)¤ -0.6662
home valid adv78¡82 0.2037 ( 1.0415) 0.0729
home valid adv83¡87 -0.3969 ( 0.6191) -0.1420
home valid adv88¡92 -0.9881 ( 1.1110) -0.3535
home valid adv93¡96 0.6064 ( 1.9288) 0.2169
patentee defendant -0.1202 ( 0.1239) -0.0430
patentee defendant hva63¡67 3.4445 ( 2.1353) 1.2322
patentee defendant hva68¡72 2.5057 ( 1.7654) 0.8964
patentee defendant hva73¡77 -0.5174 ( 1.5565) -0.1851
patentee defendant hva78¡82 -0.6174 ( 3.3376) -0.2209
patentee defendant hva83¡87 0.7940 ( 3.4713) 0.2840
patentee defendant hva88¡92 2.7208 ( 4.3301) 0.9734
patentee defendant hva93¡96 0.1411 ( 4.6283) 0.0505
Note: asterisk indicates signi¯cance at the .05 level. Additional variables included
in the model were chemical, computer, drugs, electrical, issue-year, mechani-
cal, numclaims, continuation, delay, division, assigned, numinventors, individual,
design-refs, foreign-refs, median-ref-age, oldest-ref-age, utility-refs, and decision-
age.
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